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REFLECTIONS ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR VIOLATIONS OF EXPLICIT
PROTECTORATE, MANDATE, AND
TRUSTEESHIP OBLIGATIONS
W Michael Reisman *
William Bishop's high standards of personal ethics, factual accu-
racy and scrupulous honesty marked his relationships with his col-
leagues, and his scholarly work. I knew him first through his written
work and later as a colleague on the Board of Editors of the American
Journal of International Law. As a person, he was unfailingly courte-
ous (it is impossible to imagine him otherwise); as a scholar, he was
rigorous and thorough; as Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, he was de-
manding and discriminating, but always tolerant and fair. He ac-
cepted my first article. Because he was not a member of the New
Haven School, I awaited his editorial comments with a certain trepida-
tion - needlessly. His comments were pertinent and challenging.
The result was a better article, a transformation he seemed to effect in
everything he did. He was a superior man.
Given his personality and personal principles, it was not surprising
that Professor Bishop should have chosen the area of State Responsi-
bility as his field of special concentration. Anyone who dealt with him
encountered a person who appreciated the benefits of civil exchange
and who comported himself in all exchanges according to high stan-
dards. Those two impulses, of course, animate State Responsibility. I
should like, in his memory, to explore in a most tentative way some
possible applications of the law of State Responsibility for violations of
undertakings by stronger states to weaker states during the colonial
period.
The general question of responsibility for colonialism per se is ex-
tremely complex. On the one hand, the injuries done to people sub-
jected to colonization were not characterized as delictual in terms of
the law and morality prevailing at the time. Hence retroactive ascrip-
tion of responsibility runs the danger of intellectual anachronism, no
less than a violation of fundamental legal principles. On the other
* Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. I acknowledge with gratitude the
comments and criticisms of my colleague, Myres S. McDougal. This paper has also benefitted
from discussions with Brian D. Lepard, J.D. '89 Yale, who has been working on the same sub-
ject, and from the assistance of Alison Zieve.
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hand, the authoritative condemnation of colonialism has been sweep-
ing and, at least in matters of territory, has not recoiled from retroac-
tive prescription. Even assuming that a consensus on liability for
colonialism per se could be forged, daunting problems regarding mea-
sure of compensation would remain. Using supple equitable doctrines
of unjust enrichment to establish the injury of the former colony, one
would presumably be obliged to set off against proven injuries the
long-term benefits which enured to the colony, e.g. in infrastructural
investment, and possibly subsequent aid contributions. Such calcula-
tions would be no easy task.
Where, however, a colonial state violated an explicit undertaking
that constituted, at the time, an international obligation under inter-
temporal principles, the primary issue of responsibility may be ex-
plored and resolved according to traditional and universally accepted
legal principles. The assessment of an appropriate remedy, while al-
ways extraordinarily complex in international law, may also be accom-
plished according to accepted criteria. It is this "easier" problem that
I wish to address.
I
The "Law" is frequently referred to as a unitary code of general
and equal application. But many domestic legal systems have devel-
oped alternative, contingent regimes with entirely different configura-
tions of rights and responsibilities, e.g. trusts, custodianships,
guardianships, and so on. These regimes come into operation when
the power relationship between the parties concerned is manifestly
asymmetrical. The usual legal regime regulates relationships between
parties who are in a rough state of parity of power and are operating at
arm's length; the exceptional and contingent regime regulates relation-
ships in which there is an explicit or implicit relationship of trust, or in
which one party is considerably more powerful than the other or oper-
ates with a formal or implicit authority over it. Behavior that might
be permissible under the regime regulating one set of relationships is
impermissible in the other and will generate liability. Liability is es-
tablished either by explicit rules or the imposition of obligations by
"implied" contracts or "quasi-contracts."
The formal system of international law presupposes the sovereign
equality of all states and would appear to preclude the category of
lawful asymmetrical power relationships we have considered. Where
power disturbs this presumed equality, it is often the subject of claims,
such as "unequal treaties" and, more generally, leonine agreements.
There are, however, several lawful subordinations of one internation-
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ally recognized entity to another, which involve substantial surrenders
of decisionmaking competence. Some of these factual subordinations
- for example, protectorates, mandates, and trusteeships - were
based on treaties. In addition to explicit treaty obligations, there is
evidence that customary law obligations operated on the super-
ordinated or protecting state in these relationships.'
There is, of course, a rich body of law dealing with breach of
treaty, its consequences and the procedural options it gives to the com-
plying party. But violations of treaty obligations by a protecting state
are procedurally different from violations between states in legal and
political parity and negotiating at arm's length. The protected state or
state under protectorate has, by definition, a restricted if not com-
pletely suspended competence to operate at the international level and
hence is unable to protect its interests against violations by the erst-
while protector. Thus, it should be no surprise that international deci-
sion has suspended the operation of laches for failure to prosecute
violations of interest, when the party that failed to protect its own
rights was in a subordinate position and was unable to operate in its
own name at the international level. 2 In contrast, the claims we will
consider are based upon violation of explicit international obligations
under the law that prevailed at the time of their inception and
operation.
II.
The phenomena to which these claims relate are widespread. One
early one was the protectorate. Protectorates were deemed part of the
colonial and imperial periods of international politics. The term pro-
tectorate is now considered pejorative, and is no longer used; but func-
tional equivalents of protectorates, operating with international legal
sanction, are to be found in the institution of the "associated" state
and in some ostensibly federated arrangements. 3
In international law, protectorates were established by agreements
between two international legal subjects. While the terms of the agree-
ment might have varied from case to case, the common core of all
protectorate agreements was the subordination of one party (the pro-
tected) to the other (the protector), and the assignment by the former
to the latter of some or all of the plenum of international rights to
1. See, e.g. M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRI-
TORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (1926).
2. See Cayuga Indian Claims, 20 AM J. INT'L L. 574, 575 (1926).
3. See generally W.M. REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW
ROLES IN ASSOCIATION (1975).
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which it was entitled by virtue of its international legal status. Though
the protected state continued to "exist" as an international subject, it
was procedurally dormant and could not act on its own behalf. Pro-
tectorates were terminated by the reestablishment of the plenary inter-
national legal personality of the protected state, by the total absorption
of the protected state by its erstwhile protector, or by its association
with or incorporation in another state.
In some cases, protectorates were imposed by a stronger state on a
weaker one, then organized and rationalized by a protectorate agree-
ment. In other cases, a relatively weak state, threatened by its neigh-
bors, voluntarily put itself under the protection of a stronger power -
trading a reduction in its own power for assurance of its own con-
tinuity. Thus, to cite only one example, the Kingdom of Lesotho,
threatened by Boer power expanding northward in the 19th century,
itself solicited protectorate status from the United Kingdom. 4
The normative relations between the protector and the protected
state derived both from the protectorate agreement and from custom-
ary international law. The relevance of the treaty needs no illumina-
tion, but the operation of customary international law is not quite as
obvious. The construction of the treaty and, in particular, the assump-
tions about what was actually assigned to the protector, involve cus-
tomary rules of interpretation. In particular, the canon that an
agreement not be construed to give what is not explicitly given, would
generally benefit the protected state, as would the general principles of
pacta sunt servanda and interpretation in good faith. Thus, Lindley
would appear to be correct in concluding that "advanced Govern-
ments do recognize sovereign rights in less advanced peoples with
whom they come into contact, and do, in general, deal with such peo-
ples on a treaty basis when acquiring their territory."5
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the drafters of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations established a modified form of interna-
tionally lawful superordination - the mandate. Article 22 of the
Covenant reads:
1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the
later war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which
formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that
4. See generally L. THOMPSON, SURVIVAL IN Two WORLDS: MOSHOESHOE OF LESOTHO,
1786-1870, at 297-311 (1975).
5. M. LINDLEY, supra note 1, at 46 (1926).
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securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant.
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that
the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations
who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical
position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to
accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandato-
ries on behalf of the League.
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage
of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the terri-
tory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire
have reached a stage of development where their existence as indepen-
dent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a
principal qonsideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a
stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of
the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of con-
science and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuse such as the slave trade, the arms traffic
and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifica-
tions or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives
for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also
secure legal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members
of the League.
6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of
the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their popula-
tion, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisa-
tion, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory,
and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards
above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.
7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the
Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its
charge.
8. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exer-
cised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Mem-
bers of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and ex-
amine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council
on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
Under this system, so-called A-Mandates were established for
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. So-called B-Man-
dates were established for Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Cameroon,
and Togo. C-Mandates were established for Nauru, New Guinea,
West-Samoa, Southwest Africa and the northern Pacific Islands. The
235-
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Permanent Mandate Commission went into operation in 1920 and,
with the Permanent Court of International Justice, performed a super-
visory function for the mandatory system.
The innovation of the League was carried over to the United Na-
tions system in both an optional "Trusteeship" arrangement and an
automatic non-self-governing arrangement. Article 73 of the Charter
sets forth the obligations applying automatically to members of the
United Nations with responsibilities in non-self-governing territories:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities
for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained
a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the inter-
ests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a
sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system
of international peace and security established by the present Charter,
the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples con-
cerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement,
their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop-
ment of their free political institutions, according to the particular cir-
cumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement;
(c) to further international peace and security;
(d) to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage
research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where ap-
propriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practi-
cal achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth
in this Article; and
(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information
purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional consid-
erations may require, statistical and other information of a technical na-
ture relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the
territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those
territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.
This peremptory language represented a radical departure from prior
international law: administration of non-self-governing territories au-
tomatically imposed on the superordinated party specific obligations
for the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory. While Article 73
would not appear to be applicable retroactively (in the absence of a
demonstration that, in whole or in part, it no more than codified cus-
tomary norms), it would appear to operate automatically after 1945
for all original members of the United Nations and from the moment
of accession for states which subsequently became U.N. members. In
most general terms, the Charter established a contingent regime of ob-
ligations for the welfare of subordinated states that came into opera-
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tion for any state controlling non-self-governing territory, without
regard to any explicit undertaking of such an obligation.
Article 75 of the Charter also established an international trustee-
ship system, akin to the mandatory arrangements of the League, "for
the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed
thereunder by subsequent individual agreements." Article 77 estab-
lished three categories of trusteeship, based on their provenance, but
avoided the invidious developmental distinctions of the Covenant.
Territories held under mandate, territories detached from enemy
states as a result of World War II, and territories voluntarily placed
under the system by states responsible for their administration could
all become trusteeships. The obligations of a trustee are set out in
Article 76:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the
Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present
Charter, shall be:
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational ad-
vancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progres-
sive development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
ples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and
to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world; and
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and
also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, with-
out prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to
the provisions of Article 80.
Thus international law, like many domestic systems, imposes, as a
general matter, special obligations on legal actors who exercise author-
ity over other legal actors that are unable to protect their own
interests.
III.
There are several cases of clear violation by a protecting state of
treaty rights accorded to the protectorate. One will suffice to demon-
strate the type of issue with which we are concerned. Between 1884
and the end of the century, the British government concluded a large
number of protectorate agreements with the chiefs of the Somali tribes
Michigan Journal of International Law
in the Horn of Africa.6 A number of forms of agreement were used.
One, used by the British East Africa Company, provided:
[Name of Chiefl hereby declares that he has placed himself and all his
territories, countries, peoples, and subjects under the protection, rule and
government of the Imperial British East Africa Company, and has ceded
to the said Company all its sovereign rights and rights of government
over all his territories, countries, peoples and subjects, in consideration
of the said Company granting the protection of the said Company to
him, his territories, countries, peoples, and subjects, and extending to
them the benefit of the rule and government of the said Company. 7
The agreement with the Habr-awal of July 14, 1884, commences:
Whereas the garrisons of His Highness the Khedive are about to be with-
drawn from Berbera and Bulhar, and the Somali Coast generally, we, the
undersigned Elders of the Habr-awal Tribe, are desirous of entering into
an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our
independence, the preservation of order, and other good and sufficient
reasons.
8
The agreement with the Gadabursi of December 11, 1884,
commences:
We, the undersigned Elders of the Gadabursi Tribe, are desirous of en-
tering into an Agreement with the British Government for the mainte-
nance of our independence, the preservation of order, and other good
and sufficient reasons.9
Most of the agreements involve a commitment by the tribes not to
cede their territory to any other alien without the agreement of the
United Kingdom. No agreement conveys a power to the United King-
dom itself to convey the territory involved. Most of the agreements, as
stated in the excerpts above, state expressly that they are animated by
a concern for the maintenance of the independence of the pertinent
tribe.
During the Mahdist Revolt in the Sudan, Britain was anxious to
gain Ethiopian Emperor Menelik's neutrality. Menelik's price was
territory. James Rennel Rodd, Chief Secretary of the British Agency
in Cairo, arrived in Addis Ababa in April, 1897, and concluded a
treaty and an exchange of notes ceding territory by delimiting the bor-
der between the British Somali protectorate and Ethiopia. 10 The terri-
tory ceded was Somali. Indeed, as late as 1909, the British War Office
6. Texts of the Agreements may be found in BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS vols. 75-
82 [hereinafter STATE PAPERS]; and in 18 HERTSLET'S COMMERCIAL TREATIES (1893) [herein-
after HERTSLET'S].
7. STATE PAPERS, supra note 6, at vol. 76 app. IV.
8. STATE PAPERS, supra note 6, at vol. 76 p. 101; HERTSLET'S, supra note 6, at vol. 18 p. 69.
9. STATE PAPERS, supra note 6, at vol. 76 pp. 102-03; HERTSLET'S, supra note 6, at vol. 18 p.
71.
10. S. TOUVAL, SOMALI NATIONALISM 156 (1963).
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was describing the ceded territory in an official map as "Abyssinian
Somaliland."'" The only acknowledgement of Great Britain's treaty
obligation to protect the Somalis appeared in two clauses of the treaty
with Ethiopia, one requiring the Ethiopian Government to provide the
Somalis with "equitable treatment" and orderly government, the other
guaranteeing the tribes pasturage on either side of the new frontier.12
The treaty was not published nor was the boundary demarcated at
the time, and Ethiopian rule appears not to have been felt at all. It
was only in 1934 that the Somalis became aware of the 1897 treaty.
One student of the subject writes:
It would appear plain that the British secret agreement with Ethiopia
was a violation of its treaty commitments to the Somali tribes. The fact
that these treaties were concluded in treaty form, drafted by the British
and published in British and Foreign State Papers as treaties makes it
difficult to escape the conclusion that they were so viewed by the United
Kingdom Government. 13
IV.
A right without a remedy, Holmes said, is no right at all. What
can be done when a state which is effectively superordinated over an-
other has violated one of the obligations deriving either from custom-
ary or conventional international law? The rather dismal experience
of the actio popularis in international law makes it seem most unlikely
that some variant on it will prove more effective. Remedies for viola-
tions of protective obligations cannot be derived from general interna-
tional remedy theory without certain adjustments.
The very nature of the asymmetrical relationship between the two
parties and the usually restricted international options of the
subordinated and injured party result in those features of these cases
which are common within the class, but quite different from other vio-
lations of international law. First, because foreign affairs competence
has been assigned to the superordinated party and is performed
secretly through the metropolitan, the protected party is often una-
ware of the action that has caused the injury. In the case of British
transfer of Somali territory to the Ethiopian Empire, for example, the
Somalis were unaware of the transfer for almost four decades. Second,
even if the protected state is aware of the action, its lack of interna-
tional standing prevents it from lodging a protest or initiating an ac-
11. Sketch Map of Somaliland, [British] War Office, (July, 1909) (Copy on file in Library of
Congress Map Division).
12. See HERTSLET'S, supra note 6, at vol. 18 pp. 428-29.
13. See I. LEwis, THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA 107 (1980).
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tion for remedy. The continuation of the subordinated status means,
additionally, that the injury is likely to become a settled state of affairs
long before the subordinated party acquires sufficient independence to
press the claim on its own behalf.
Under the circumstances, it would appear lawful for the former
protected state to press the claim against the former superordinated
state. A claim would have to be pressed within a reasonable time after
the former protected state had emerged from its subordinated status,
taking account of the disruptions attendant on state successions of this
sort.
Remedy theory in international law has expressed a preference for
specific performance or restitutio in integrum when it is feasible, and
substituted performance when it is not. Some treaty violations be-
tween superordinated and subordinated states, such as spoliation of
national treasures in violation of the protectorate agreement, lend
themselves to specific performance; but other violations, such as alien-
ation of territory of the protected state to a third state in violation of a
protectorate agreement, often can not be repaired by the former pro-
tecting state. Indeed, subsequent absorption of the illegally trans-
ferred territory could well be irremediable, if the population of the
latter territory has been totally replaced and/or has come to freely
identify itself with a new sovereign. In cases such as these, liquidated
damages would appear appropriate.
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